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From the European Union’s beginning all the way up to the decisions of the 
Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference, the process of European integration 
has been shaped by two competing schools of thought, one aiming at the 
creation of a communitarian union and the other at establishing close 
intergovernmental cooperation between states. Most of today’s achievements in 
European integration are based on a compromise between, or a parallel use of, 
these two competing concepts. The dichotomy is clearly reflected in the Union’s 
institutional development and present set-up concerning external relations. 
Whenever one school was successful in institutionalising new policies, the ideas 
of the other school were also included. The procedure seems to have led to 
ineffectiveness - sometimes even to complete standstill. Thus, the combination 
of the two concepts in one structure is contradictory rather than complementary.
Although many in Europe had hoped for a change after Amsterdam, the 
basic paradox continues. There are more contradictions - some of which have 
been reinforced by the decisions of June 1997, others mollified, but by no 
means abolished. And why should they be? Has not the Union become closer in 
the last forty years? It seems that paradox is the secret recipe for success. Take 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): if one digs deeper into its 
structure and functioning, it is neither common, nor foreign, nor dealing with 
security, nor can be called a policy. Yet, most observers and policy makers use 
the acronym CFSP like a magic formula: it is enough to invoke the name and 
the EU instantly turns into a major actor - if not a superpower - in world affairs. 
The paradox is that the mantra effect is even stronger outside Europe than 
inside. Perceptions are very important in international relations. The EU seems 
to profit from this fact.
While the EU claims to conduct a common foreign and security policy, it 
largely lacks the means and capability needed to make decisions and implement 
them. Theoretically, CFSP can draw support from other EU policies (economic 
external relations, development policy, humanitarian policy) or from the 
Western European Union and its connections with NATO. In practice, however, 
the link with instruments outside of CFSP is not developed to the degree that it 
would be available whenever needed. Likewise, the EU has not developed a 
sufficient level of solidarity among its Member States in matters of foreign and 
security policy. There is also little hope that this will ever change and yet, the 
show goes on. The Amsterdam reform conference solemnly declared to produce 
‘deepening’ as a precondition for ‘widening.’ It failed at ‘deepening’ during the 
June 21 meeting, nevertheless on July 17 the Plan 2000 was launched the 



























































































Identifying Institutional Paradoxes of the CFSP
In the first section of this article, we will consider the institutional 
inconsistencies and contradictions inherent in CFSP and in the larger 
institutional context within which it operates. In section two, we want to 
highlight several reasons for these institutional paradoxes, for example the 
concept of unity: Should unity evolve automatically, or is there a need for 
coercion? To answer this question we will take a closer look at the aim of 
CFSP, as viewed from the perspective of the Member States. We will find that 
the CFSP is viewed as an instrument for achieving national foreign policy goals, 
which arise from individual Member States’ national interests. What is 
problematic in this context is the fact that national interests and national foreign 
policy goals are often divergent. Clearly, diverging interests are not a sound 
basis for unity.
The EU’s foreign policy structure: institutional rigidity or wrong track?
Amsterdam has been another round of trying to fine-tune the operational 
procedures and the institutional structures of CFSP with the desperate goal of 
overcoming, or rather transcending, some of its absurdities. Procedural and 
institutional improvements matter, but they are only marginal efforts as long as 
the central issue of modernising the content and substance of EU foreign and 
security policy is not taken up and resolved. Contrary to traditional foreign and 
defence policy, in the future almost all sectors of public life will have external 
implications. Therefore, the issues on the external policy agenda will be 
characterised by these interrelating and overlapping sectors. The present 
compartmentalised structure of the EU’s external relations seems to rigidly 
ignore the nature of today’s international world. Can the EU afford this 
institutional rigidity or has it chosen the wrong track?
CFSP in the pillar system
The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) stipulates that CFSP is to include ‘all 
areas of foreign and security policy.’1 The notion of all areas certainly 
comprises major components of the EU’s common trade policy, its development 
policy, its non-proliferation policy, and its humanitarian policies. The definition 
of CFSP’s potential sphere of activity is further extended by Art. J. 4 I TEU, 
which states that ‘all questions related to the security of the European Union’ 
are included in CFSP. If the final aim is to develop a CFSP addressing all 
questions of foreign and security policy, the current division of labour and 
power sharing structures within the Union seem inadequate.2 In a future- 




























































































third pillar should be merged into deliberations and decisions within CFSP. 
There is one provision in the Treaty of Amsterdam which may be interpreted as 
a step towards modernisation: the strategic questions clause in J.3 (formerly J.8 
(1) and (2), first subparagraph) provides heads of state and governments with 
the theoretical option of broadening the thematic scope of CFSP action.
Nevertheless, the authority of the CFSP foreign ministers remains 
limited. Despite the fact that they are the masters of the General Council, they 
still lack the power and the assertiveness to direct their First and Third Pillar 
counterparts, not to mention WEU defence ministers and the ‘European section’ 
of NATO. The consistency of CFSP depends on the institutional links between 
three structures: CFSP, other EU policies, and the military policies of WEU and 
NATO. Certainly, the goal cannot be to have the EU foreign ministers dictate 
policies to their counterparts in the trade and defence departments, but they 
ought to adopt a comprehensive approach and orchestrate various concerns and 
instruments in the EU’s external relations. But the institutional set-up is not 
very favourable in this regard - neither in the European Commission, the 
European Parliament, nor in the Council itself - and Amsterdam did not bring 
much change in this regard.
The Commission vs the Council - a problem of initiative
Ever since Maastricht the Commission has had the right to make foreign policy 
initiatives within CFSP, but has been hesitant to do so unless the policies are 
based only on Pillar I instruments. The Commission also has refrained from 
using the full extent of its competence in Pillar II, fearing that 
intergovernmental policy directed by Pillar II might contaminate the 
communitarian Pillar I. This hesitation was evident in the EU’s policy on 
Rwanda in 1994, when a CFSP common position initiated the (obligatory) 
action of the European Commission.3 Likewise, the general decisions on 
imposing economic sanctions in the cases of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Libya were made within CFSP while the Commission 
then had to initiate the implementation process by proposing concrete sanctions 
to the Council.
A series of similar procedures contributed to in-fighting over institutional 
matters.4 If the power to decide on communitarian action originates increasingly 
from deliberations within CFSP, then the function of originally communitarian 
instruments and actors, such as the Commission and the Parliament, would be 
gradually reduced to the execution of CFSP policies. The Commission itself 
could help re-govemmentalise the communitarian Pillar I, if it would make full 




























































































dilemma. Instead, since the heads of state and government could not agree on 
reducing the number of commissioners, the Commission continues to divide the 
competence for foreign and security policy between five Commissioners, thus 
undermining its own stance within the institutional texture of the EU.
The European Parliament vs the Council - The budget question
If the ‘common’ in CFSP is to be taken seriously, then all actors should be 
adequately involved in the policy-making process. One of the most striking 
paradoxes of CFSP has been the arrangement of its budget. One might assume 
that EU common action is financed by the EU and, in turn, the availability of 
EU financial assets should commit Member States to common action. This, 
however, has not been the case. As the TEU describes, EU funding is a 
possibility, not a prerequisite, for CFSP action. The incompatibility of aims and 
powers has created a paradoxical situation under the Maastricht treaty. This has 
been partly remedied at Amsterdam through an informal understanding between 
the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament, which at least raises the level 
of transparency on budgetary matters.
While the European Parliament has the power to control the budget (and 
thereby gain some influence over Community policy), this power does not apply 
to CFSP. Article 199 TEC states that there are financial assets for CFSP, but it 
does not stipulate where these assets are to be posted or how much is available. 
In the past this has led to the use of assets reserved for other purposes. Because 
CFSP is a reactive policy, it is impossible to propose a CFSP policy agenda and 
budget for the coming year. This poses a constant problem for allocating 
sufficient funds to cover CFSP expenses.
Art. 199 TEC contributes to this uncertainty, because it makes a 
distinction between the administrative and operative costs of CFSP. 
Administrative costs of CFSP are automatically covered by the Community 
budget, whereas whether or not to cover operative costs is decided by a 
unanimous vote in the Council. However, in the absence of a clear definition of 
‘administrative expenditures’ it is left to the Council to decide this matter too, 
thus giving it the power to circumvent the Community’s budgetary decision­
making procedure. Moreover, because the Council and the EP had previously 
agreed not to examine each other’s expenditures, the EP’s actual power is 
somewhat limited also in those cases where the normal budget decision making 
applies. Thus, CFSP is linked to the Community’s budget, but not necessarily to 




























































































The Council’s foreign policy making
Who is administratively preparing the Council’s decisions, and who is advising 
it on questions of substance? The Maastricht Treaty states that the division of 
labour between the Political Committee and COREPER is subject to future 
discussion.5 It thereby left a very important aspect of CFSP decision making 
unsettled. The TEU itself suggests that labour is divided between administrative 
and political work. Art. J. 8 (5) TEU (Art. J. 15/Amsterdam) assigned an 
advisory and controlling function to the Political Committee, indicating that 
advising the Council on political issues is the main task of the Political 
Committee. The same article states that Art. 151 TEC is not affected by this 
provision. This implies that COREPER was meant to extend its preparatory 
work for the Council to the sphere of CFSP. The provision may seem logical, 
but in fact it is problematic.
Although COREPER’s work was intended to be primarily administrative, 
much of it actually represents policy shaping, since it prepares Council 
decisions by reaching consensus between representatives of national foreign 
ministries and the Commission beforehand. If agreement is reached in 
COREPER on any given topic, it is no longer subject to Council debate. In 
effect, this gives COREPER a policy coordination task under Community rules 
of procedure, including the settling of political issues prior to debate in the 
Council. The arrangement established by the TEU thus creates competition 
between both committees, which in turn leads to further complication of CFSP 
decision making. It also creates competition between different sections of the 
Member States’ foreign ministries, because the Political Directors are 
represented in the Political Committee, while the Member States ‘EU 
ambassadors’ are represented in COREPER.
CFSP’s inter-organisational links: WEU, NATO, UN
In order to be effective and credible, CFSP needs more than the backing of 
other EU policies. Although certain EU policies employ political and economic 
instruments in solving external problems, the EU lacks the authority and 
adequate instruments to implement them. Whenever the EU decides to act i 
these
necessary authority and instruments, like the WEU, NATO, and UN, becomes 
important. Viewed in the context of the paradoxical set-up of intra-institutional 
links, the external inter-institutional links are even more confusing.
Looking at its history, it is hard to find any significant WEU operation. 




























































































US considered this crisis to be a European affair and was not willing to 
intervene. Since this meant that NATO was stepping aside, it would have been 
the perfect scenario for using the WEU structure.6 Despite the availability of the 
WEU, Britain and France did not assign WEU to command their troops sent to 
the former Yugoslavia. Like other EU Member States’, these troops were 
conducting operations under the auspices of the UN. This was a result of the 
Europeans not being unified on the aims of intervention. The Yugoslav crisis 
demonstrated that CFSP does not have a military arm.
Although CFSP is meant to address all EU security issues, it is designed 
to address the political issues only. Since the defence ministers did not 
participate fully in the Maastricht negotiations, the CFSP itself lacks an 
operational level. This is due to the fact that EPC was given the task of 
organising European positions and actions in other organisations and 
institutions. But the aim of CFSP differs fundamentally from that of EPC. CFSP 
is supposed to be an active EU foreign policy by initiating and determining 
external action from within the EU framework, eventually leading to the 
formation of a European defence identity. Analysing CFSP actions of the past, 
one can easily come to the conclusion that CFSP in practice essentially is not 
about planning concrete policy measures, but about reacting to crises. For this 
purpose, the institutional set-up is entirely insufficient.
One major reason for this insufficiency is the lack of a powerful 
instrument, a ‘military arm’ of the EU. The EU is not a military organisation 
and has no troops assigned to it.7 As a consequence, in order to conduct 
(military operations or) operations with military assistance, the EU must request 
assistance from outside its own framework. One possible candidate is the WEU. 
But the WEU has not been used for such purposes in the past, as was pointed 
out above. There are two main aspects to be considered when investigating why 
this has been the case; one relates to the criterion of efficiency, the other to the 
criterion of commitment.
To understand why the criterion of efficiency is important, one must look 
at the implications of military action. In order to conduct a successful operation, 
one needs sufficient numbers of troops, the ability to transport them to the 
mission area, and reliable intelligence information. Although not lacking in 
troops, Europe lacks transport capabilities and intelligence information. It also 
essentially needs a unified command, which the WEU cannot provide. In NATO 
all these insufficiencies are counter-balanced by the integration of American 
armed forces and American military hardware. Another aspect deserves 
attention in this context. As was seen during the second Gulf War, in order to 




























































































expressed in the will to use force when it is deemed necessary and in the ability 
to determine the objectives of military action, also accounts for the credibility of 
American action. In military terms, the decisiveness of American politicians in 
using military force when it is deemed necessary adds an additional deterrence 
value to the already well-trained and well-equipped American troops. This 
aspect seems to pose a major problem for the Europeans. The Yugoslav Crisis 
demonstrated that Europeans experience difficulties in using military force and 
to agree on the objectives of a military intervention. Since the Europeans could 
not agree on the objectives of a military intervention, their potential force could 
not be used as a deterrent. By contrast, when acting within the NATO 
framework, European NATO members can count on the assistance of American 
hardware and, perhaps more importantly, on the political backing of the United 
States. This makes their own action more credible. In this sense, not even the 
WEU is able to conduct the limited tasks assigned to it in the Petersburg 
declaration, without NATO assistance.
The criterion of commitment is important as well, since it may give an 
account for the backing that Member States actually carrying out the operation 
will receive. To full WEU Member States, it is unacceptable to give non-full 
members a say in the decision-making process, because their commitment levels 
are mirrored by their WEU status. The problems of insufficient linkage between 
EU and WEU would not occur if there were coherence in the membership 
policies of all EU Member States. For example, if all Member States were full 
WEU members as well, the problem of command would not be as pressing as it 
is today. Likewise, were Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Ireland to become 
NATO members, there would at least be a real EU group that could speak with 
one voice.
Under the present conditions the reluctance to ask for WEU assistance is 
natural. Any attempt to change the current inter-institutional setting by 
producing some kind of command authority of CFSP over WEU assets, without 
solving the problem of coherence of membership, is bound to fail. In light of 
this statement, the assumption that CFSP will benefit from the concept of 
‘Combined Joint Task Forces’ (CJTF) allowing WEU to use NATO structures, 
may be misleading. Although the concept could turn out to be an effective 
method for conducting military operations in a European framework, it is not 
necessarily relevant in a CFSP context. Even if CFSP requests WEU action, 
there would be no implementation unless the WEU and NATO decided to 
cooperate. Furthermore, since CJTF does not establish CFSP command 
authority over WEU troops, the aim, intensity, and duration of WEU operations 
would be determined outside the EU framework. Thus, the CJTF might 




























































































Organisations that are capable of implementing EU decisions or requests 
(NATO and WEU) can only act in accordance with international law. This 
means that, in case of an emergency, any action taken by NATO or the WEU on 
behalf of the EU must conform the policy of the UN Security Council (UNSC). 
This principle also applies to the imposition of EU economic sanctions. The 
EU’s CFSP is weakened, since it does not have a direct say in UNSC decisions, 
it does not have legal personality, and, is therefore not considered to be subject 
to international law.8 To overcome this legal inconvenience, those EU Member 
States that are also permanent UNSC members are obliged to promote the 
‘interests of the Union’ and common positions, whenever acting within the 
UNSC.9 However influential this provision may appear, it is nothing more than 
a declaration of the fact that the UNSC permanent members, Great Britain and 
France, are also members of the EU. There are no implications, since real 
problems cannot arise in practice. This is due to the fact that a common position 
within CFSP can only be reached if all Member States agree. If they agree, it is 
unnecessary for Great Britain and France to oppose the position within the 
UNSC. If, however, GB and France take a different position from that of all 
other EU Member States, no common position within CFSP has been reached. 
The 1995 French nuclear testing program provides for a good example. When 
France ran its nuclear testing program in late 1995, there was no common 
position on this issue within CFSP. The Council could not decide whether to 
call upon the European Atomic Community (EAC) for action. Also, while some 
EU Member States supported a resolution in the General Assembly urging 
France to stop the testing, Great Britain took France’s side while other Member 
States refrained from voting. Even if all other EU Member States would have 
supported UNSC action against the testing, France and Great Britain (being 
both permanent UNSC members and in agreement on the subject) would have 
been able to prevent any binding UN decision contrary to their own interests.
In addition, the EU’s internal multiple foreign policy system further 
complicates matters since it predominates in all EU relations with the UN. 
However, this paradoxical institutional set-up is necessary since the EU itself 
can not act within UN bodies, while the Community can. When trying to 
develop a consistent common policy, the external competences of the EU 
Council and the European Commission do not coincide with their competences 
in CFSP decision making. By contrast, the Council and the Commission are 
only entitled to express their own views within some international 
organisations, like the UN and the WTO, if they do so as the EC’s 
representatives.10 Since there is no direct institutional link between the 
Community’s external relations and the Union’s CFSP, the outcome of the dual 




























































































The CFSP concept: Dead end or freeway to an ever stronger Union?
The Member States in 1991/92 all accepted the metamorphosis of the European 
Community. They thereby accepted the transformation of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) into CFSP. However, the performance of CFSP in the past 
suggests that the question regarding the purpose of CFSP has not been clarified. 
The ultimate aim of CFSP must be to take action. Nevertheless, in CFSP the 
requirement of unanimity and the principle of solidarity contradict each other. 
More importantly, this constellation leads to passivity because it might prohibit 
actions in an EU context. Neither the majority nor the minority can use CFSP if 
there is no common position.
Since each Member State has the right to veto common positions or 
common actions, any Member State can determine whether or not the others are 
going to have a common policy within the CFSP sphere of action. This is 
essentially due to the institutional set-up of CFSP, which leads to permanent 
confrontation rather than unity. Unlike the EC’s communitarian policy process, 
the EU’s CFSP process is not evolutionary by nature. Once the EC has made 
full use of its ‘exclusive competences,’12 the Member States lack the legal 
authority to act in the same policy area. Thus, whenever follow-up decisions 
need to be taken in the same specific policy area, it can only be taken at the 
Community level. The Member States, having agreed to transfer competences 
from the national level to the community level, accept this logic of consistency 
in Community action within the transferred policy areas.
This is not the case with CFSP. The absence of a permanent and clear-cut 
division of labour between the EU and its Member States, complete with a clear 
definition of specific policy areas and reserved for an exclusive and consistent 
common policy, is obvious. Therefore, every follow-up action is subject to 
another debate about its necessity because the Member States have the option of 
taking a national decision. In every decision-making process the fundamentally 
different positions of the integrationists and the intergovemmentalists clash, 
opening old wounds. For example, the provision for the operational costs of 
CFSP is designed to give non-integrationist Member States the opportunity to 
be obstructive. If community funding of common actions is not possible, the 
other Member States will have to provide the funding themselves, and apart 
from being generally opposed to additional expenditures during economic 
downturns, the active Member States will also face the technical problem of 
burden-sharing between themselves. Furthermore, whenever the Council 
decides to draw on Community resources, it re-opens the debate about the EP’s 





























































































As demonstrated by the lifting of economic sanctions against South 
Africa and Haiti, the intergovemmentalists have a strong instrument for 
preventing the majority from acting against intergovemmentalists’ interests. 
Contrary to its intention and meaning, CFSP joint actions can be used to prevent 
action, rather than initiating it. When institutionalising EU’s use of economic 
sanctions, the competence for initial decision making was given to the EU 
Council (CFSP), since it corresponded with EPC practice. Article 228a TEC 
explicitly empowers the EC Council to take immediate action on economic 
sanctions whenever the EU Council has decided in favour of a joint action or a 
common position within the framework of CFSP. It thereby establishes a 
Community competence to impose sanctions, based on Art. 113 TEC. However, 
Art. 228a TEC implies that Community Council powers are subordinated in 
relation to the EU Council powers, vested in the CFSP framework. Since the 
initial decision to impose economic sanctions has to be taken within the CFSP 
structure by a unanimous vote, any single Member State can prevent such a 
decision. Furthermore, the Commission is not necessarily involved in the 
shaping of the initial CFSP decision but must act within the EC framework.
In the absence of a permanent settlement of institutional provisions, 
policy makers have institutional objectives per se.14 This may lead to entirely 
paradoxical situations. ‘[Policy makers] may accept particular policy outcomes 
because of their institutional consequences and may even reject policy outcomes 
that favour their substantive policy interests because they do not wish to accept 
the institutional implications.’15 This situation suggests that the Member States 
are simply not interested in conducting a Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
But is this really the case?
National interests and CFSP
All Member States view CFSP as a potentially useful instrument for achieving 
their national foreign policy goals.16 To some Member States CFSP seems to be 
the only suitable approach toward having a global foreign policy, while to 
others, depending on the issue, it is merely an optional approach. Thus, while 
some Member States may press for EU action, others may try to prevent it. The 
following lines might highlight what accounts for these different approaches.
From the individual Member States’ perspective, EU decision making is 
national foreign policy making in itself. The Member States’ (foreign) ministers 
meet in the ultimate decision-making authority of the EU: the Council. Here 
they discuss and they may decide on political issues on the basis of national 
interests. Since EU policy must pay attention to its own interests, the outcome 




























































































interests are not respected sufficiently. And since they have other options, they 
do not need the EU framework to take action. The fact that Member States’ 
national interests are often divergent has far-reaching implications. An anecdote 
of the 1994 accession negotiations may be useful to illustrate the argument.
From an EU-centric view point (the so-called Brussels’s view point), the 
1995 enlargement was beneficial per se, because it would improve the economic 
situation of the Union as a whole. Although important economic issues had 
been settled quite satisfactorily before, in the 1992 treaty, establishing the 
European Economic Area (EEA), enlargement was thought to be even better for 
the Union: The EU would improve its position in world (economic) politics 
because its weight automatically increases with every new Member State, for 
example in GATT/WTO. In the case of Norway, entry would have contributed 
to an improvement of the EU’s supply situation (energy; food) and it would 
have given the EU a stronger stand in the so-called world-wide 
consumer/producer dialogue on energy-related questions. However, from the 
individual Member States’ perspective, this assessment only partly reflected the 
heart of the matter. Giving full access to the common market to formerly 
excluded companies (and in some areas also to states) meant that competition 
would increase, posing a problem for those Member States whose industries 
were not very competitive. Thus, Member States negatively affected by the 
entry of new members were particularly interested in preventing the EU from 
making concessions. During the 1994 negotiations in-fighting between Spain 
and Norway on the issue of fishing rights was pronounced. These arguments 
were transferred to the EU level when Germany pressed Spain to concede to 
Norwegian conditions for entry. This in turn led to a mini-crisis in Franco- 
German relations, since the French became concerned about German ‘power 
politics.’17 The dispute was settled by giving Spain better access to EU 
territorial waters and allowing it to enter the common fisheries’ policy regime 
earlier than originally intended.
What is most important in this context is the observation that Member 
States accept the Union’s interests only when they do not affect their national 
interests. Seen from this angle, the Union’s foreign policy is the result of a 
careful balance of the interests between all Member States. Taking the argument 
to the limit, one can even say that every successful decision made by the EU 
and the EC is based on such a balance of interests.
This balance of interests is essential, because it creates unity by paying 
attention to the needs of individual Member States. Furthermore, it is a 
prerequisite for the solidarity principle. All Member States should show 




























































































only in situations where an individual Member State’s interests clash with the 
interests of the Union as a whole. The ‘balance’ principle legitimises the 
evocation of the ‘solidarity’ principle, because all Member States received 
concrete benefits when the initial decision was made. If a Member State has 
accepted the initial decision because it was beneficial, it has no right to question 
it at a later stage. As we will describe in the following section, the TEU in its 
CFSP title explicitly calls for solidarity, but it does not allow for an adequate 
balance of interests.
Formalised solidarity - unity by force?
In its statement concerning the voting principles of CFSP decision making 
(Maastricht final act), the conference of the representatives of the Member 
States’ governments concluded that in cases where unanimity is required, 
individual Member States should refrain from dissenting if there is a qualified 
majority in favour of a common action. The contradictory wording - separating 
unanimity in vote from consent on an issue - points to what seems to be the key 
problem with CFSP: Unity. In the TEU, unity is imposed on the Member States 
by obligating them to act for the sake of action.
In this context, the solidarity principle of CFSP is entirely ineffective, 
because it produces a stand-still in ‘policy-production.’ On the one hand, it 
seeks to oblige the single Member States to respect the interests of the majority 
outside CFSP.18 On the other, it provides the single Member States with the 
opportunity to block any majority action within CFSP.19 This means that any 
single Member States can determine what is to be ‘the common positions or the 
interest of the union.’
However, the solidarity principle of the TEU is also problematic for the 
minority. There are reasons for some Member States to be more reluctant to 
communitarise CFSP than others. These reasons are found in the difference of 
single-state policies. If all governments would have the same opinions on all 
policy issues, there would be no debate about majority voting. Since this is not 
the case, the provision of unanimous voting is necessity for those Member 
States that fall into the minority in their policy approach. There are some issues 
that simply cannot be addressed by the EU, because they are regarded as 
national issues. In such cases no Member State would ever accept an EU policy 
contrary to its own aims. The 1995 French nuclear testing program must be seen 
in this context. Applied to more pro-active EU ventures, the reason for the 
limited success of EU foreign policy might just be the differing interests of EU 
Member States. For example, the EU’s approach to the Middle East is hampered 




























































































Nordic EU members does not necessarily coincide with the economic and 
political interests of Mediterranean France. It must be accepted that some issues 
remain outside the range of EU/CFSP action, although they essentially shape 
the Union’s image in world politics.
Conclusion
Since CFSP lacks a clear-cut decision-making authority, it cannot enforce its 
decisions either through the other pillars or through the Member States. And 
since the EU lacks legal personality, it has to rely on different actors to 
implement its decisions. These institutional deficiencies led to an ineffective 
foreign policy and sometimes even to total passivity. As long as the institutional 
arrangements remain unsettled, any political issue will automatically be viewed 
as a means for bargaining over institutional arrangements.
The establishment of a functioning decision-making structure within 
CFSP, therefore, was the main issue in the debate about the EU’s future 
engagement in world politics. The current structure is ineffective, because it 
gives every Member State the opportunity to block a decision reached by the 
rest of the Member States. The use of majority voting instead of unanimity in 
the decision-making structure, however, is not the cure. This becomes clear 
when one looks at the capacity of EU Member States. Not all Member States 
have the capacity to implement a common decision. Thus, giving Member 
States that are unable to contribute substantially to common actions themselves 
a say in the decisions on common action is controversial and leads to reluctance 
towards CFSP from those Member States that bear all the costs. However, a 
Common Decision would be of very little practical use if the only Member 
States that could implement it were to refrain from action. This may also 
explain why the linkage between the Union and those organisations capable of 
implementing the EU’s decisions is insufficient. Since not all EU Member 
States are full WEU or NATO members, they themselves do not show the same 
level of commitment as full members of all three organisations.
Reluctance of the EU to act within CFSP also arises from the way CFSP 
defines solidarity between the Member States. During the 1994 enlargement 
negotiations, for example, Spain expected solidarity from its EU partners on the 
fishing issue, while Germany pressed for solidarity on the overall issue of 
enlargement. By contrast, in 1995, when Canada accused a Spanish trawler of 
illegal fishing activities, Spain was backed by its EU partners. When France ran 
its nuclear testing program in 1995, it expected solidarity from its EU partners. 




























































































depends on the interests at stake. If the national interests of all Member States 
can be met sufficiently, solidarity on that issue will automatically appear 
because there also is unity. If not, a lack of solidarity is inevitable.
The only way to improve this situation is to define the issues that can be 
resolved by the Union as a whole. To achieve this, a binding, concrete, and 
specific agenda for CFSP action finally must be shaped. The first step would be 
to establish a centre for assessing Member States’ positions on all the issues 
facing the EU in the near future. This would imply that the EU also finds a way 
to reach a balance of interests on all specific issues. The next step would be to 
pre-plan common action regarding these issues. It should be left to the Member 
States to determine which organisational framework they want to use for the 
implementation of a common decision. A balance of interests must be reached 
here as well. If every Member State is satisfied with the outcome, the final step 
would be a formal ‘communitarisation’ precluding unilateral Member State 
action, in contrast with common action. Thus, to make the EU’s CFSP work, it 
is essential to focus on substance first. Only then will the Member States be 
determined to agree upon the procedural aspects. If influence could be more 
carefully balanced with commitment and capabilities of each Member State, 
CFSP might just turn out to be beneficial for all Member States. The EU may 





























































































1 See Art. J. 1 ITEU.
2 For example, in today’s world, development policy must be regarded as an essential part of 
foreign policy. Furthermore, the case of Algeria proves that deficiencies in the development of 
third world states may even have a direct impact on EU security. The Maastricht Conference 
in 1992 paid attention to this fact and dedicated a whole title in the EU’s treaty framework to 
development. However, development policy was not included in the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU) itself as an objective of common interest. Instead, the legal basis for a ‘common 
development policy’ can be found in Title XVII (Art. 130u-y) of the Treaty of the European 
Community (TEC). What should actually be called the EU’s development policy is described 
here as the EC’s ‘development cooperation.’ This set up reflects the differing integration 
objectives of the EU Member States. On the one hand, decisions regarding ‘development 
cooperation’ can be made by a qualified majority - thus, the ‘willing’ can act. On the other 
hand, ‘development cooperation’ is restricted in its contents, as it is merely ‘complementary’ 
to the development policies of the Member States. Hence, individual Member States cannot 
be forced to change their own policies.
3 See Horst-Giinter Krenzler and Henning C. Schneider, ‘The Question of Consistency,’ in 
Foreign Policy o f the European Union. From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, eds. Elfriede 
Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent, and Wolfgang Wessels (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997): 145.
4 See Elfriede Regelsberger and Wolfgang Wessels, ‘The CFSP Institutions and Procedures: A 
Third Way for the Second Pillar,’ European Foreign Affairs Review 1:1 (1996): 40.
5 See the Declaration regarding practical details of CFSP in the Masstricht Conference’s final 
act.
6 The WEU was declared the military arm of CFSP and the ‘bridge’ between the EU and 
NATO. One was also thinking of the WEU as having a kind of deputy role, in case NATO 
itself was not willing to act. This is reflected in the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) 
concept, which allows for the use of NATO structures by the WEU.
7 Theoretically, this could be changed by transforming Pillar II into a regional defence 
organisation with additional tasks and assigning Member States’ troops to it. The WEU would 
become an integrated part of CFSP and WEU action would be under CFSP command. This 
would give the EU command authority vis a vis its Member States and would lead to the 
creation of strictly European defence forces. However, the problem military integration poses 
is evident in the reluctance of WEU Member States to integrate their organisation into the EU 
structure. This situation is not likely to change.
8 In its ‘Addendum to the Dublin II general outline for a draft revision of the Treaties,’ the 
Dutch presidency included the proposal for a draft version of a ‘New Article A in the TEU.’ 
This new article states that ‘[t]he Union shall replace and succeeds to the European 
Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy 




























































































relations, the Union shall enjoy legal capacity to the extent necessary for the exercise of its 
functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.’ While giving legal personality to the EU would 
ensure that the Union can implement some of its own (CFSP) decisions, merging the existing 
legal personalities of the three Communities and that of the Union into a single legal entity 
could ensure consistency in the Union’s foreign policy. See ‘Addendum to the Dublin II 
general outline for a draft revision of the Treaties,’ CONF/2500/96 ADD. 1 (March 20 1997).
9 See Art. J.5 IV TEU.
10 Due to the ‘exclusive’ competence of the EC in the area of trade and tariffs, the Member 
States themselves can not act on their own. This has led to the working arrangement between 
the Council (and thus the Member States) and the Commission regarding trade policy. The 
Council gives a mandate to the Commission to negotiate trade agreements with third 
countries, and within international organisations, but the Council itself has the decision­
making authority. Within GATT and now the WTO, however, the EC may not ratify the 
agreements. This has to be done by the Member States at the national level.
11 For example, while the decision to contribute to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO) was taken by a common position under CFSP, the Community was to 
finance the contribution, and the EACommunity was to become a member of KEDO. This 
division of labour seems to make sense, because it reflects the respective competences of the 
actors involved. Nevertheless, if the EAC becomes a member of KEDO, it will be difficult to 
monitor the process through the CFSP structure.
12 The EC possesses ‘exclusive’ competences vis & vis its Member States in the area of 
Common trade and tariffs. Its mere existence prohibits any unilateral Member State action. 
The EU possesses ‘competing’ competences as well, which constitute the most common form 
of legal relationship between the EC and its Member States. In this case, the Member States 
can act unilaterally as long the EC has not made use of its own competence. Note, however, 
that they may not act in contradiction to already established EC policies.
13 See Elfriede Regelsberger and Wolfgang Wessels, op. cit., p. 41.
14 See Helen Wallace, ‘The Institutions of the EU: Experience and Experiments,’ in Policy­
making in the European Union, eds. Helen Wallace and William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996): 38.
15 idem. One should carefully avoid generalising this thesis, because it seems unlikely that 
Member States will act in this way, if crucial policy interests are at stake.
16 See Elfriede Regelsberger, ‘The Institutional Set-up and Functioning of EPC/CFSP,’ in 
Foreign Policy o f the European Union. From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, eds. Elfriede 
Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent, and Wolfgang Wessels (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997): 74. Christopher Hill points out, in his contribution 
to this volume, that most Member States even have the option of instrumentalising other 
organisations. Once they have decided to act on an issue, like the integration of Eastern 




























































































17 The dispute was settled in Ioannina, where Spain obtained better access to British territorial 
waters and was allowed to enter the common fisheries policy regime earlier than originally 
intended.
18 For example, Art. J. 5 IV TEU obliges those Member States, who are also permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, to promote the interests of the EU within the UNSC. 
Also, Art. J. 1 IV TEU demands that Member States refrain from taking unilateral action 
which is designed to contradict the Union’s interests.
19 This is due to the rule of unanimity-decisions on common positions and common actions, 
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